

THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ACCORDING TO NOAM CHOMSKY

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Abstract: Colin Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State, argued once that “America has been created by divine providence to lead the world.” Some scholars agree with such a statement but others argue that the U.S. foreign policy not only contradicts such ideology but furthermore it is to blame for the suffering of many peoples around the world, by abusing the principal rights of human beings and by supporting authoritarian governments and violators of fundamental human rights. There are many critics on the means that the United States uses with regards to foreign policy, and the double standard on promoting democracy on one hand, and collaborating with dictators on the other hand, sets a double standard. The most prominent critic of the US foreign policy is the internationally well known scholar Noam Chomsky. He has long kept up a second career as a cogent voice of the left, excoriating American imperialism, critiquing American foreign policy and attacking global economic injustice and violation of human rights. In his book *The umbrella of the U.S. power*, Chomsky observed the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a “Path to a Better World” while chronicling how far off the trail the United States was with respect to actual practice and conduct. He examined how the U.S. not only violated the Universal Declaration, but at times used it as a weapon to wield selectively against designated enemies. We find the same writing in other books by Chomsky such as *Rogue States, 9-11, Acts of Aggression*, the collection of essays, *Human Rights Fifty Years On - A Reappraisal*, etc. In his writings and open lectures, Chomsky's critiques on American foreign policy started from the Marshall Plan up to the present day. He refers to the U.S. as one of the “worst violators” of human rights, and a country that stood accused before the international Court of Justice for the “unlawful use of force” in its terrorist war against Nicaragua, the attack against South Vietnam, Indonesia, and more. The cases of U.S. military interventions observed by Chomsky are numerous and they all come as support to his statements that the U.S. is “regarded as a rogue state.” This paper will evaluate some of Noam Chomsky's views on the U.S. foreign policy and Human rights issues. The allegations made by Chomsky and the cases mentioned by him are numerous but I will focus on the relation between U.S. foreign policy and the UDHR, the military interventions, economic sanctions, national security, national interest, domestic factors, the Human Rights World Conference in Vienna, 1993, and an evaluation of the U.S. Presidents' policies on human rights.

Keywords: Chomsky, USA, policy, UDHR.

1. INTRODUCTION

U.S Secretary of State, Colin Powell, argued in August 1995 that “America has been created by divine providence to lead the world.” Some scholars agree, but others argue that the U.S. foreign policy is to blame for the suffering of many peoples around the world, by abusing the principal rights of human beings and by supporting authoritarian governments, regimes, and violators of human rights. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate some of Noam Chomsky's views on the U.S. foreign policy and Human rights issues.

Noam Chomsky is a strong voice of the left, excoriating American imperialism, critiquing American foreign policy and attacking global economic injustice and violation of human rights.

In *The umbrella of the U.S. power*, Chomsky observed the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a “Path to a Better World” while chronicling how far off the trail the United States was with respect to actual practice and conduct. He examined how the U.S. not only violated the Universal Declaration, but at times used it as a weapon to wield selectively against designated enemies. We find the same writing in other books by Chomsky such as *Rogue States, 9-11, Acts of Aggression*, and the collection of essays, *Human Rights Fifty Years On - A Reappraisal*, edited by Tony Evans. In his writings, Chomsky's critiques on American foreign policy started from the Marshall Plan up to the present day.

For example, the fact that “as the Marshall Plan went into full gear the amount of American dollars being pumped into France and the Netherlands was approximately equaled by the funds being siphoned from their treasuries to finance their expeditionary forces in Southeast Asia,” to carry out terrible crimes. And that under U.S. influence Europe was reconstructed in a particular mode, not quite that sought by the anti-fascist resistance, though the fascist and Nazi collaborators were generally satisfied.” (Chomsky, 1999) He has continually referred to the U.S. as one of the “worst violators” of human rights, and a country that stood accused before the international Court of Justice for the “unlawful use of force” in its terrorist war against Nicaragua.(Chomsky, 2000) Other judgments included the U.S. attack against South Vietnam, and omitting more dramatic examples, such as the U.S. attack against South

Vietnam from 1961-62, when the Kennedy administration moved from support for a Latin American-style terror state to outright aggression, facts that it still "wouldn't do" to admit into history. Another case of Chomsky's criticism was in 1978 "when Indonesia was running out of arms in its attack against East Timor, then approaching genocidal levels, thus, the Carter Administration had to rush even more military supplies to its bloodthirsty friend. Another case arose a year later, when the Carter Administration sought desperately to keep Somoza's National Guard in power after it had slaughtered some 40,000 civilians." (Chomsky, 2020) The cases of U.S. military interventions observed by Chomsky are numerous and they all come as support to his statements that the U.S. is "regarded as a rogue state, and with good reason"(Chomsky, 2022) that "regards the crimes against the weak to be as normal as the air we breathe." (Chomsky, 2011)

Human Rights is a political debate but according to Chomsky, the contradictions of U.S and UDHR were very obvious. Let us have a closer look at the Declaration and the different facts and opinions concerning the U.S. policy and Human Rights issues.

2. U.S. POLICIES AND UDHR

The adaptation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, constituted a step forward in the slow progress towards the protection of human rights. UDHR was intended to set goals for all countries and for the international order itself in the recognition and protection of individual rights. It was not however intended to be legally binding. Over the past forty years the UN has initiated a large number of treaties designed to commit states to uphold the principles of the Declaration as a matter of international obligation. (Boyle, 1995)

According to Chomsky, the overreaching principle of the UDHR is universality The battle of universalism versus relativism of the UDHR took place in June 1993 at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. This conference was the second international consultation focused exclusively on human rights. Representatives of 171 states and of international agencies were joined by an estimated 800 non-governmental organizations. The U.S. delegation was headed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher who had promoted human rights as Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter Administration. The key purpose of his speech was to defend the universality of human rights, rejecting the claims of those who claimed cultural relativism (mainly China and Iran). In Vienna, Washington's decisiveness prevailed. The challenge of relativity was beaten back and the conference declared that "The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question." Warren Christopher's words were "The United States will never join those who would undermine the Universal Declaration." (Christopher, 1998)

Despite the fact that the U.S. insisted on the universalism of the UDHR and that it would defend its universality against those who held "that human rights should be interpreted differently in regions with non-Western cultures," Chomsky accused the Secretary of State of hypocrisy. He argued that Christopher's statements were in contradiction to the spread of arms from the U.S. and other Western countries to brutal dictatorships. Thus, if "the worst violators are the world's aggressors and those who encourage the spread of arms," what are we to conclude about the world's leading arms' merchants, which at that time boasted well over half the sales of arms to the third world, mostly to brutal dictatorships? (Christopher, 1998)

The U.S. has now ratified the International Civil and Political Covenant, and The Convention against Torture. The State Sovereignty principle, based on the UN Charter Article 2, can be used as an excuse by many governments to name human rights violations as a domestic issue. But what attitude should the U.S. have regarding these "domestic issues?" One example, torture under investigation (Article 5, UD), is a matter mentioned by Chomsky in his writings. He argued that the United States shared the blame for all the Palestinians killed or tortured by Israel because of the constant support that the U.S. gave to Israel. There have been given some theoretical explanations that human rights policy involved risks and problems for the U.S. These risks are categorized of three kinds: those that endangered the human rights policy itself, those that might adversely affect other national interests, and the risks involved in returning to a policy of doing nothing at all. (Sirkin, 1979)

Some of the risks and problems for the U.S, in response to cases of human rights violations might be as follows:- Some governments might crack down harder on their internal issues in order to demonstrate independence from outside pressure; if expectations were raised by publicized human rights efforts and nothing changed, the general letdown might contribute to a loss of credibility; if a human rights effort were directed at many countries at once, it could lead to a ganging up of authoritarian regimes to resist the onslaught against them; in particular cases, any public confrontation between the U.S. and another government over human rights issues could jeopardize other vital U.S. interests, such as the continuation of energy supplies or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his address at the World Conference, Warren Christopher made clear the U.S. attitude against the violators of Article 5, "Our agenda for freedom must embrace every prisoner of conscience, every victim of torture, every individual denied basic human rights."(Christopher, 1998) He also emphasized tough measures against the violators of human rights, "Those who desecrate these rights must know that they will be ostracized. They will face sanctions. They will be

brought before tribunals of international justice. They will not gain access to investment or assistance. And they will not gain acceptance by the community of civilized nations... We must confront the abusers. We must sharpen the tools of human rights diplomacy to address problems before they escalate into violence and create new pariah states." (Christopher, 1998)

Being aware of Article 2 of UN Charter, and the risks of human rights policy, Christopher approached the human rights violators in a legally correct and diplomatic way as follows: "States that respect human rights and operate on democratic principles tend to be the world's most peaceful and stable... Denying human rights not only lays waste to human lives; it creates instability that travels across borders." In Vienna, Christopher emphasized the universality of UDHR, the tough measures against the violators of human rights, but he concluded that national interest and national security are paramount in building a human rights policy. The U.S. response to human rights violators is related strongly to the risks for the foreign policy and to its national interests. The response has to be decided in relation to important national interests such as preservation of peace, restraint of nuclear proliferation, promotion of economic progress in the developing world or other vital U.S. economic objectives. According to David P. Forsythe, the U.S. is caught between two worlds, that of interstate relations, and that of global governance. (Forsythe, 2017) Another view is that the elements that constitute the U.S. national interest may vary with different epochs and individual states. The United States may depend on resources from a particular region; it may desire basing rights in some countries, listening posts in others; it may find markets of little interest in some areas, or seek to expand trade and investments where lucrative possibilities appear to exist. National interests in terms of political or ideological orientations became a predominant factor in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The central focus of the national interest is on preserving or enhancing the physical security, economic prosperity, and strategic interests (in terms of defense and resources) of the United States; it is aimed at maintaining or enhancing the nation's power and position. (Steinmetz, 1994)

Articles 5 and 14 fall under the category of civil and political rights. UDHR also recognizes economic, social and cultural rights. In Chomsky's view these are dismissed in the West, particularly the Article 25 (the Right of Development), which declares that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control." Given its extraordinary advantages, according to Chomsky, the United States is in the leading ranks of relativists who reject the universality of the UDHR by virtue to Article 25 alone. He criticized the U.S. for promoting military expenditures of the "developing countries" while social spending was being severely cut, and foreign aid had sharply declined. To ensure universal access to basic social services, UNICEF estimates that it would require a quarter of the annual military expenditures of the "developing countries," about 10 percent of U.S. military spending. (Chomsky, 2020) The United States, in some critics' view, could and should offer more aid to developing countries. It could seek to channel such aid to countries and populations in greater need. It could not however compel governments to meet their people's economic needs or to establish greater economic equity within their countries. In Vienna, Christopher mentioned that respect for human rights was not only politically beneficial but economically too. "(Christopher, 1998)

3. THE U.S. SANCTIONS

There were two important issues related to economic rights and two parts to Chomsky's criticisms:- sanctions imposed or initiated by the United States on other countries, allegedly to punish human rights violations and for national security reasons, and ignored or undermined sanctions against brutal regimes. Of 116 cases of sanctions used since World War II, according to Chomsky, 80 percent were initiated by the United States alone, measures which have often received international condemnation. He mentioned the economic warfare against Cuba since 1961, the longest in history, also unique in barring food and medicine. (Chomsky, 2022)

A case, given by Chomsky, of ignored sanctions were those imposed on Haiti. Also instructive is the record of sanctions against Haiti after the military coup of September 1991 that overthrew its first democratically-elected government after seven months in office. The United States had reacted to president Aristide's election with alarm, having confidently expected the victory of its own candidate, World Bank official Mark Bazin, who received 14 percent of the vote. Washington reaction was to shift aid to anti-Aristide elements, and to honor asylum claims for the first time, restoring the normal defense of Article 14 of the UDHR after the military junta let loose a reign of terror, killing thousands. The Organization of American States (OAS) declared an embargo, which the Bush Administration quickly undermined by exempting U.S. firms "fine tuning" the sanctions, the Press explained, "in its latest move" to find "more effective ways to hasten the collapse of what the Administration calls an illegal Government in Haiti."

Officials of the U.S. Justice Department revealed that the Bush and Clinton Administrations had rendered the embargo virtually meaningless by authorizing illegal shipments of oil to the military junta and its wealthy supporters.... When diplomacy proves ineffective, more costly measures may be deemed necessary to effect policy changes abroad. To demonstrate U.S. determination, economic and/or military sanctions may be imposed. The effectiveness of economic and/or military sanctions, such as refusal to extend aid or permit the import or export of goods or weapons, is dependent upon the vulnerability of the target state and the availability of alternative sources for aid and/or trade. It is important to mention the risks that these sanctions involve for the U.S. foreign policy and national interests. Bilateral relations between states deteriorate. Furthermore, although sanctions are intended to influence events abroad, the initiating state, or its allies, may be adversely affected as well. In the cases of authoritarian regimes such as Iran, a major oil supplier, and the Philippines, a military strategic country in controlling the Pacific, the reverse impact of a sanctions policy would have meant economic and strategic losses for the United States. A successful sanction policy may also depend upon domestic reaction in the target state; punitive measures imposed by an initiating government may in fact serve to rally domestic support for a regime that would otherwise suffer public disfavor. Following U.S. human rights-related aid cuts to Brazil in 1977, for example, members of Brazil's opposition party, who had previously criticized human rights violations in their country, denounced the United States. (Steinmetz, 1994) Economic sanctions may be imposed as a means of inflicting "pain" to achieve desired objectives in target states. But even where bilateral aid is decreased or halted, private business activity and multinational assistance often continues to flow; the threat or use of economic sanctions may therefore be rendered impotent, just like the Haiti case mentioned by Chomsky. While economic sanctions carry greater costs and indicate a more intense concern than the use of diplomatic measures alone, they have not proven to be wholly reliable as policy strategies.

"The sanctions on Syria are brutal and destructive. Sanctions generally attack the civilian population. They have no effect on the leadership. They're murderous and brutal. That's what sanctions are like. The sanctions on Iraq, for example, devastated the country. [They] didn't harm Saddam Hussein, and his coterie, in fact, it probably strengthened them because the population had to rely on them for survival. In fact, they might have been overthrown from within if it hadn't been for the sanctions. Well, we're seeing that again in Syria, as we see it in other places. It's a horrible situation. It's hard to see anything good, almost anywhere," said Chomsky in an interview, commenting on some more cases of U.S sanctions (Helali, 2022)

Numerous studies have questioned the effectiveness of economic sanctions in altering government behavior. In some cases they have produced results opposite to those desired by the initiators of sanctions. It is necessary to recall that the U.S. is not seriously restricted in its foreign policy on human rights by regional and global human rights treaties. The U.S. position is quite different from the West European democracies which are subject to authoritative review by the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice, and which have accepted the review mechanisms of various UN human rights conventions. The U.S., by comparison, is either not a party to the human rights treaty in question, or has freed itself from most monitoring in one way or another. The U.S. is not subject to the jurisdiction of any human rights tribunal. Thus any U.S. President has considerable leeway to initiate human rights measures in foreign policy. Whether he can obtain congressional, public, and allied support is another matter. The Carter to Clinton administrations, mostly criticized by Chomsky, have found human rights a most perplexing issue in foreign policy. Carter entered office with a vague and naïve view of the place of human rights in foreign policy. He had proclaimed human rights to be the cornerstone and soul of his foreign policy. He wrote in his memoirs: 'I did not fully grasp all the ramifications of our new policy'. (Carter, 1982) He never developed a strategic vision in this regard, much less an awareness of the negative consequences of good intentions. How did human rights relate to state security? Should human rights pre-empt transitional pursuit of private profit? The reasons for the weaknesses in Carter's human rights policy were the inexperience of his Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia Derian, the ineffectiveness of both his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and his principal deputy on human rights, Warren Christopher, and also of his anti-Soviet minded National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Brzezinski, 1985)

Despite his strong anti-Soviet feelings, Brzezinski, put a major emphasis on the importance of human rights in foreign policy. In his memoirs he gave a clear definition of Carter's human rights policy: The President signed the result, Presidential Directive 30, on February 17, 1978. Its essential points were: (1) Priorities were set among U.S. human-rights objectives- reducing worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person, and enhancing civil and political liberties. It was also a continuing objective to promote basic economic and social rights. (2) There would be greater reliance on positive incentives that acknowledge improvements; for example, by special consideration in allocating U.S. aid. (3) No U.S. support, "other than in exceptional circumstances," would be allowed for policing functions by governments guilty of serious violations of human rights. (4) U.S. human-rights initiatives in international financial institutions would be geared "so as not to undermine the essential U.S. interest of

preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. Carter did exert some gentle diplomatic pressure on various authoritarians in Zaire and South Korea. He successfully fought to restore pressure on Ian Smith and his white minority government in Zimbabwe. He helped institute a United Nations arms embargo against racist South Africa. He particularly pressured Latin authoritarians to liberalize. Lives were saved in places like Argentina and Chile because of Carter, Derian, Vance, and company. Carter was totally dedicated to human rights. In his memoirs he wrote: When I announced my candidacy in December 1974, I expressed a dream: 'That this country set a standard within the community of nations of courage, compassion, integrity, and dedication to basic human rights and freedoms.' (Carter, 1982) Domestic demands unrelated to international human rights, namely an end to stagflation, and important foreign affairs, namely an expanding Soviet Union and militant Islamic revolution in Iran, overshadowed many of Carter's rights initiatives, making him a one-term president. Some critics' view on Carter's 'absolute' commitment to human rights is that it 'was dangerous and disingenuous.' (Dumbrell, 1997) To a large degree, the human rights policy became a policy for South Africa, the Soviet Union and, especially, for Latin America, where the U.S. enjoyed particular leverage. Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay all had security assistance cut off at some stage during the Carter Presidency. The main problem with Jimmy Carter was that he did not do what he said he was going to do, while the problem with Ronald Reagan was that he did exactly what he said he would do. Reagan said he was going to direct human rights concerns toward the Soviet Union and other communists. In the first Reagan Administration human rights policy consisted largely of double standards through which communists were criticized if not punished, and friendly authoritarians were courted. These friendly authoritarians were courted for strategic reasons and their human rights violations were discounted. Indicative of Reagan's human rights policies was the fact that U.S. security assistance in various forms was increased dramatically around the world, without attention to human rights records. The Reagan team supported anti-communist rebels in places like Angola and Afghanistan, and largely created them in Nicaragua, regardless of their attacks on civilians or other violations of human rights. By 1988 there were important similarities between Reagan and Carter on human rights. Each sought to advance human rights inconsistently, where major security and economic interests did not interfere. Each largely ignored some major human rights problems. When the Reagan Doctrine of covert overthrow of pro-Soviet governments ran into predictable trouble under the international law principle of non-intervention, Reagan ignored the World Court's critical judgment in Nicaragua vs the U.S. and launched a series of debilitating diplomatic attacks on the Court for being 'political' and anti-American. As in the first Reagan Administration, it was not respect for international standards on human rights that impacted executive decision-making. Rather, it was changing views of the national interest in interstate politics. George Bush Senior's overall foreign policy has been analyzed in terms of mastery and incompetence. His record on human rights in foreign policy defies easy labeling. He, or his lieutenants, protested Bulgarian discrimination of its Turkish minority. He increased the pressure on the Salvadoran government to bring death squads and other human rights violators under control. But he also downgraded gross violations of human rights in places like Iraq prior to August 1990, and China during and after June 1989. Bush showed more interest in human rights, not less, than Carter and Reagan. Bush showed more interest in human rights in El Salvador, not less, than Carter and Reagan. Of course by the time of the Bush Administration, the U.S. did not need states like Israel and El Salvador as strategic allies in the Cold War. Thus, the realistic reason for downgrading human rights was no longer relevant. The situation in the Persian Gulf was illustrative of Bush's approach to human rights. Prior to August 1990 Saddam Hussein was seen as a useful ally in containing Iranian influence. When Congress wanted to curtail trade with Iraq on human rights grounds during the spring and summer of 1990, the Bush Administration was strongly opposed. Realism guided policy. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that August, Bush led the charge in picturing Saddam Hussein as not just a threat to oil lines in the Western coalition but an incarnation of Hitler, thoroughly evil to the core. The most lurid charges about Saddam Hussein's policies in both Kuwait and Iraq were used to mobilize American support for Desert Storm. As a result, some observers viewed Bush as highly moralistic and legalistic. But the Bush Administration did not put any pressure on Saudi Arabia to democratize after Desert Storm, after all, Saudi Arabia had served as the main base of military operations and was still important to Western economies. So the overall record of U.S. attention to human rights in the Persian Gulf was shifting, dependent as it was on Washington's perceptions of short-term interests particularly access to oil and containment of Iran. Bush could be forceful on human rights matters. It was his decision in the autumn of 1992 that placed some 30,000 U.S. troops in Somalia to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief in a situation of widespread starvation and breakdown in order. It was Bush's decision in the spring of 1991 that led to military involvement inside Iraq and the eventual creation of a zone of Kurdish autonomy where, with the help of the UN, Kurdish rights were better protected than before. But in China, where the U.S. had important economic and security interests, Bush postured in public over the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square, whilst sending envoys in private to tell Chinese leaders that important relations would continue. There was not much of a pattern to Bush policy on internationally recognized human rights. It was not driven by a

frequently articulated belief in American 'exceptionalism', as was the case with Carter and Reagan. Nor was it driven by attention to global governance. Bush signed and sent to the Senate the 'UN Convention Against Torture', where advice and consent was obtained. Bush also obtained advice and consent for the 'UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', signed by Carter long before. Without a clear strategy on rights, the Bush Administration was buffeted by 'the CNN factor'. On Iraq in 1991 and Somalia in 1992, media coverage combined with European and UN pressures, respectively, explained at least partially why Bush employed military force. The lack of Western media coverage in places like Mozambique, where disorder and starvation were also remarkable, helps explain the lack of U.S. concern. In 1992 Clinton repeatedly criticized Bush for his inattention to human rights in places like China and Haiti. Clinton promised to make at least democracy, if not the broader concept of human rights, a main issue in foreign policy. He named Warren Christopher as Secretary of State on the basis of his experience in the Carter Administration. A number of Clinton appointees had experience with private human rights groups. Upon assuming office, however, Clinton continued a number of Bush policies, whilst agonizing over the choice. This was most prominent regarding Haitian policy during 1993, when Clinton continued the very policy he had lambasted during the presidential campaign, namely, the interception of fleeing Haitians outside U.S. territorial waters and their forced return to Haiti without a full hearing of their claims to refugee status, meriting temporary asylum. In 1992 Clinton repeatedly criticized Bush for his inattention to human rights in places like China and Haiti. 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Clinton's Haitian policy tended to disprove the assumption that after Somalia the notion of humanitarian intervention had peaked. Clinton was prepared, finally, to remove the Haitian military rulers by force if necessary." Similar was Clinton's dilemma in China. He had made China the centerpiece of his Right rhetoric, and in his first year as President had delayed a tough decision by issuing an Executive Order linking Most Favored Nations status in trade to Chinese improvement in specific human rights matters. But in June, 1994, Clinton abandoned that linkage. China had not made significant progress in a number of human rights areas, so clearly so that no amount of rhetorical gymnastics could obfuscate that fact. Yet the U.S. had continuing economic interests in China of sizeable proportions. And the U.S. wanted Chinese cooperation on a range of political issues involving North Korea, Cambodia, Iran, the UN Security Council, etc. thus Clinton essentially reverted to the Bush policy of mixing human rights into a broad foreign policy dialogue, whilst giving Beijing a mild slap on the wrist in the form of limited sanctions - a ban on U.S. importation of certain Chinese weapons. Like Carter, Clinton showed an inclination toward international standards on human rights, promising to advance a number of human rights treaties pertaining to children, economic and social rights, and rights in the Western hemisphere under the American Convention on Human Rights. With Clinton's support, in the fall of 1994 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended U.S. ratification of the UN treaty on discrimination against women. At the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Clinton Administration accepted the notion of a human right of development - long favored by the poor states but long rejected by American conservatives fearing socialism and an obligatory trans-national transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor. While Clinton agonized over how to respond to the war in the former Yugoslavia, he did provide relatively large diplomatic and financial support to the associated war crimes tribunal created by the UN. Like Carter, Clinton seemed to want to lean towards a liberal foreign policy geared toward the global politics of trans-national governance. He sought UN approval for military action in Haiti." In his writings, Chomsky was very critical of the above five administrations but he did not take into account some other issues which influenced or altered the presidential decisions (especially after the Cold War period), regarding foreign policy and human rights. (Chomsky, 2022)

4. CONCLUSION

The Defense Department and the Pentagon have been more comfortable fighting high-tech, industrialized military wars rather than low-level warfare, deploying limited force for limited and complicated human rights purposes in places such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Because of a mixture of domestic factors of the American body politic - the general public, the business community, the Pentagon, and the Congress - one can better understand why human rights remained a fixture on the agenda of U.S. Presidents and of U.S. foreign policy. In the Umbrella of the U.S. Power, Chomsky analyzed the role of the U.S. in human rights issues and the contradictions of the U.S. foreign

policy with the UDHR. He observed the 50th anniversary of the UDHR and examined how the U.S. violated it. According to him, for most people the rights of the UDHR are little more than a paper promise. According to the Amnesty International Report 'governments around the world have failed to live up to their promises. (Amnesty International, 1998) Chomsky, as a defender of human rights, was right to defend human dignity and to criticize the U.S. Presidents and the U.S. foreign policy for acting in contradiction to the principles of the UDHR. At the start of his essay he wrote that 'examples must be chosen carefully to give a fair picture', (Chomsky 2020) but Chomsky's views did not present a totally fair picture; they were too ideological.

His allegations did not reach the heart of the matter. He regarded the national security or the national interests factors as excuses of the U.S. government for the military actions against other countries. He was skeptical of U.S. Presidents, Carter to Clinton, but he did not consider the domestic pressure that they were under, nor give them some credit for their achievement in human rights issues. He did not mention the difficult human rights cases and the tension during the Cold War period, and most importantly the complexity of Human Rights policy in itself. Chomsky emphasized the universality of the UDHR and so did Warren Christopher in the World Conference in Vienna, but yet scholars may argue that apart from its universality, the UDHR is not legally binding. It is true that the U.S. should increase its foreign aid but the U.S. cannot compel governments to meet their people's economic needs or to establish greater economic growth within their countries. Because of the state sovereignty based on Article 2 of the UN charter, the U.S. is limited in how much it can interfere with other governments' decisions. The UDHR sets out the human rights which are fundamental to the dignity and development of every human being. These range from economic rights, such as the right to work and to an adequate standard of living, to political rights, such as freedom of opinion, expression and association. They include civil rights, such as equality before the law, and social or cultural rights, such as the right to education and to participate in the cultural life of the community. The UDHR proclaims that all these rights belong to all people.

In effect, the UDHR was a promise made by governments to work towards a world without cruelty and injustice, a world without hunger and ignorance, but fifty years after its proclamation, the U.S. and other governments of the world have failed to live up to that promise.

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