

THE RECOGNITION DILEMMA OF KOSOVO: WHY DO STATES FAIL TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON STATEHOOD?

Rinesë Krasniqi

Republic of Kosovo, rinesak61@gmail.com

Milazim Hajra

University of Prishtina, Republic of Kosovo, milazim.hajra@uni-pr.edu

Abstract: The recognition of Kosovo is one of the most debated issues in contemporary international relations. Since declaring independence in 2008, Kosovo has gained more than 100 recognitions, over half of which are United Nations member states, but it still struggles in its ongoing efforts to consolidate its statehood and achieve full international recognition. Therefore, this paper analyses the dilemma of Kosovo's recognition and explains why states still fail to reach a consensus on its statehood, focusing on political, geopolitical and strategic factors. The research methodology is based on a qualitative approach, including academic literature, official state positions and other relevant international documents on the issue. What emerges from the analysis is that great powers tend to shape the dynamics of recognition, while smaller states often follow the positions of their main strategic partners. In the case of Kosovo, concerns about territorial integrity and the fear of creating a potential precedent for other separatist movements remain key factors in states' willingness to recognize Kosovo. The study shows that Kosovo has pursued an active approach through bilateral recognitions and engagement in multilateral forums, focusing initially on international partners and countries with strong relations with Kosovo. On the other hand, states that have not yet taken positive decisions for recognition remain influenced by internal prejudices and insecurities. For this reason, some of them have misinterpreted the case of Kosovo and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Some regional powers around the world have not recognised independence not because of Kosovo itself, but due to geopolitical rivalry with Western-aligned countries. In addition, due to geographical distance, there are countries that lack focus and interest in foreign policy issues, which means that they are completely unaware of the circumstances of what Kosovo is and whether or not to make a decision is not a concern for them. Of course, it has often been the American and European partners, but there are also small countries in the world that have in some cases been influential in lobbying for recognition. This process has also involved well-known and influential personalities lobbying for Kosovo, while the active participation of Kosovo's diplomacy in multilateral forums around the world has been particularly decisive, as these forums have provided opportunities to meet with political leaders and decision-making diplomats from targeted states, from whom recognition of Kosovo has been sought. In conclusion, the paper finds that Kosovo's recognition has been shaped more by political interests than by normative legal principles, proving that recognition is often treated as a political instrument rather than merely a legal act. As a recommendation, it is reaffirmed that Kosovo should continue strengthening its diplomacy and expanding international cooperation to gain further recognitions. This study contributes to a better understanding of recognition as a political instrument and may serve as a useful reference for readers, students, and the academic community.

Keywords: Kosovo recognition, international relations, statehood, political factors, geopolitics.

1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, many changes have occurred: some states have disappeared as a result of occupation, division into multiple states or merger with other states. As a result of these processes, new states have also been created. International law is based on the principle that the creation of new states is a matter of fact rather than law, therefore it is considered that a new state, upon its emergence, becomes a subject of international law. In this sense, recognition has the character of an act through which a state acknowledges that a political community possesses the attributes of statehood (Gruda, 2009). Since its declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo has become one of the most debated cases of state recognition, where, although international law provides general criteria for statehood, in practice state recognition is not applied equally to all new states in the international system. Why, then, does Kosovo's recognition remain contested in the international system, despite fulfilling the criteria for statehood under international law? In the case of Kosovo, this contradiction is evident, where after independence, although it has been recognised by a significant number of states, it continues to face opposition from others, resulting in a divided international response. According to recent reports, Kosovo has been recognised by over a hundred states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, n.d.), but the exact number remains politically contested due to de-recognition campaigns and changes in the diplomatic positions of some states. This reflects that, in practice, political, strategic, and geopolitical factors influence the recognition process. In these circumstances, recognition is shaped not only by legal arguments, but also by the interests and positions of key international actors. Some states have supported

Kosovo's independence as a unique case related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 1998–1999 conflict, as well as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which held that this declaration did not conflict with any norm of international law (Hoti & Musliu, 2015). In this way, the issue of recognition has now become a largely political process, based on the strategic interests of states. It is also important to note that the pace of recognitions is not constant, as a result of the hesitation of five EU member states, as well as of several other states that have concerns regarding precedents or internal conflicts. Despite this, the Republic of Kosovo is increasingly gaining international subjectivity, which is also evidenced by its membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The declaration of independence in 2008 and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo by many countries also contributed to bringing stability to the Balkans and closing the chapter on the protracted disintegration of what was once Yugoslavia (Bajrami, 2025). Therefore, the varying positions of states have significantly hindered the achievement of a full international consensus on Kosovo's statehood.

2. KOSOVO'S PATH TO INDEPENDENCE

The creation of the state of Kosovo took place under difficult conditions and circumstances. In the 19th and 20th centuries, important historical decisions were made in Kosovo, political platforms were drafted, and major battles for the independence of Albania were fought. During the 20th century, the case of Kosovo as an unresolved political problem reflected the balance of power among the Great European Powers of the time, as well as the relations between the small Balkan states (Hoxhaj, 2016; Malcolm, 2001). Under the Ottoman Empire, Kosovo functioned for centuries as an administrative unit, and during this period it was not part of Serbia, as there was no Serbian nation-state at the time to include it within its territory (Hoxhaj, 2008). According to Malcolm (2001), Kosovo had never been legally part of Serbia and he clearly explains that the Albanians of Kosovo did not become citizens of Serbia, while they became part of Yugoslavia. However, in any case, the creation of the state of Kosovo is primarily connected with the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Imeri & Azizi, 2023). Under the political system of Yugoslavia after the 1970s, Kosovo had all the institutions and attributes of a federal unit, similar to other republics. There was even an institution known as Secretariat for Foreign Relations, which in the period 1972–1977 was under the leadership of Ukshin Hoti (Hoxhaj, 2016). When the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation began, protests against Serbian repression also started in 1981, with the most dramatic developments occurring only after the death of Josip Broz Tito. In the case of Kosovo, the international community was based on the premise that Kosovar society should be patient until a favorable solution was secured. However, following the situation in Bosnia, Kosovo became the next focal point of conflict, where conditions for violent escalation were already present. Kosovo had enjoyed autonomy granted by Tito in 1974, but the Serbs under Milosevic's leadership tried to reunite it with Serbia. Thus, its autonomy was revoked in 1989 (Bajrami, 2014). The revocation of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević marked a turning point in Kosovo's political trajectory and its relations with the international community (Judah, 2008). This undoubtedly angered the Albanians, and in September 1990 they declared the Republic of Kosovo, which was not recognised by either the international community or Belgrade. In fact, the Albanians attempted to follow the example of the Slovenes, Croats and Bosniaks, who had gained independence. There were even those who were in favor of unification with Albania, others like Ibrahim Rugova chose the path of negotiations with Belgrade to avoid civil war (Duroselle & Kaspi, 2009). Thus, the situation in Kosovo also concerned European actors, but due to the strong international focus on Bosnia and the Dayton Agreement, Kosovo was not mentioned, or even invited at all. By 1998, this situation changed, and armed conflict in Kosovo began, marked by Serbian military operations against the Kosovo Liberation Army. The situation worsened further, leading to ethnic cleansing, with almost half of the Albanian population being forced to flee Kosovo in 1999. The international community attempted to resolve the conflict through negotiations and consequently organised the Rambouillet Conference, which proposed the full restoration of Kosovo's autonomy and the establishment of its institutions. As expected, Serbia rejected the agreement, while the Albanian delegation accepted it. In response to Serbian refusal and continued violence, NATO launched a 78-day air campaign that forced the withdrawal of Serbian forces. Subsequently, under the leadership of the UN and NATO, civilian and military forces were deployed in Kosovo to restore peace and assist in reconstruction (Beha, 2024). Furthermore, under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, a civilian administration (UNMIK) and an international military force (KFOR) were established in Kosovo to restore order and support democratic development. During this period, Kosovo enjoyed considerable autonomy during the transitional phase of international administration, although this phase was also preparing the ground for its final status. The failure to resolve Kosovo's status through mechanisms such as the Rambouillet Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 led to the launch of the "standards before status" policy in 2003 (Bajrami, 2014). The March 2004 unrest marked a turning point, showing that the ambiguous status quo was unsustainable and risked leading to renewed instability. For this reason, phases of political transition were proposed that included "independence without full sovereignty". In 2005, Martti Ahtisaari was appointed by the UN Security

Council to mediate the final status negotiations, and after 15 months he proposed supervised independence for Kosovo (Beha, 2017; Ahtisaari Plan, 2007). Although Serbia rejected the plan, it formed the basis for the country's declaration of independence and subsequent state-building process. An important aspect is that the plan was not formally adopted by the UN Security Council due to opposition and vetoes from Russia and China, but it served as the normative framework for Kosovo's declaration of independence. Eventually, Kosovo was declared an independent and democratic state on 17 February 2008, marking the beginning of a new phase of international recognition and consolidation.

3. THE RECOGNITION PROCESS OF KOSOVO

Unlike many other states, which have been recognised through various international conferences, agreements, and direct collective recognition by other states, Kosovo has followed a different path based primarily on bilateral recognition (Hoxhaj, 2016). Kosovo's struggle for international recognition has been one of the most defining aspects of its foreign policy since its declaration of independence. Emerging from the historical turmoil and ethno-political tensions of the Balkans, Kosovo has faced significant diplomatic challenges, regional resistance, and the influence of global powers in its efforts to affirm its sovereignty. The failure of the UN Security Council to adopt Ahtisaari's proposal for independence compelled Kosovo to pursue recognition through bilateral channels, making the process both difficult and gradual for a new state. Kosovo has been officially recognised by most UN member states, all neighbouring countries except Serbia, 22 of the 27 EU member states, and the majority of NATO members, with only four NATO member states still withholding recognition. It has also been recognised by the G7 countries, as well as a large number of states across Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. In the early days of independence, the main supporters of Kosovo, such as the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and many European countries recognised the independence. It is worth noting that these countries are also among the main supporters of Kosovo and have helped promote international recognition (Szeląg, 2024). Also, Turkey has emerged as an important ally, providing strong political, economic and cultural support. In the following months, the geography of recognition increased rapidly, and Kosovo was constantly gaining new recognitions. The first recognitions came as a result of the merits of diplomatic processes, as at that time the foreign service was not yet fully consolidated, while the President and Prime Minister of the country were pushing forward the recognition agenda (Hoxhaj, 2016). After this wave of recognitions, which largely consolidated Kosovo's statehood, the process slowed down, partly due to opposition from its opponents. During this period, Serbia attempted to obstruct Kosovo's recognition process through various diplomatic and financial incentives, including promises of economic assistance and enhanced multilateral cooperation to developing countries in exchange for non-recognition. In this context, Serbia pursued an active diplomatic campaign at limiting Kosovo's international recognition. However, the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence confirmed that it did not violate international law (Hoti & Musliu, 2015). The same logic was followed by its allies, including Russia (Serbia's key ally) and China, which, due to their veto power in the UN Security Council, continue to block Kosovo's membership in the United Nations and other international organisations. These early patterns of opposition, particularly Russia's stance during the NATO and UN engagement period in Kosovo, indicated how it would later approach the Kosovo issue (Hoxhaj, 2022). Also, Kosovo has received limited recognition from former Soviet states, as well as from countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, which reflects the significant indirect influence of Russia, an influence that is often greater than is thought. On the other hand, the justification for the non-recognition was precisely the fact of creating a precedent. At the same time, through them, it controls the (de)stability of those countries, as Russia had done to some regions close to it, which it would push towards recognition, using the Declaration of Kosovo's independence as a justification for its actions (Imeri & Azizi, 2023). In addition, the phenomenon of "withdrawal of recognition" represents a relatively new challenge in international diplomacy, and Kosovo is one of the cases where this dynamic has become evident. Although theoretically it may seem impossible, in practice it has happened. The first withdrawal of recognition took place in 2013 by São Tomé and Príncipe, after which the de-recognition campaign intensified, particularly after 2017. Furthermore, Belgrade has actively lobbied states facing their own separatist movements to withdraw recognition of Kosovo, arguing that such recognition could set a dangerous precedent for their territorial disputes (Visoka, 2025).

4. FACTORS BEHIND NON-RECOGNITION

Historically, different states across various cultures, circumstances, and geographical contexts have been recognised for a range of reasons, meaning that there is no single common denominator. In the case of Kosovo, non-recognition is primarily influenced by a combination of legal, political, and geopolitical factors operating within the international system. From a political perspective, decisions regarding recognition are closely linked to fundamental principles of international law, particularly issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Many states hesitate to

recognise Kosovo due to concerns that such a decision could set a precedent for separatist movements within their own territories (Daku, Haziri, & Shabani, 2024). This is particularly sensitive for states with ethnic diversity, autonomous regions, or unresolved territorial disputes. At the strategic level, recognition decisions are often influenced by alignment with key allies and partners, especially the United States and several European Union member states. An important structural factor is the lack of full consensus within the European Union regarding Kosovo's independence. Five EU member states: Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Spain, have not recognised Kosovo. The reasons for non-recognition in these cases are primarily linked to domestic political considerations rather than external geopolitical or legal assessments (Hoxhaj, 2016). At the same time, some other non-European countries had internal political problems, often instigated by other states, such as Serbia. External influence is evident in cases where decisions on recognition are not based only on independent assessments, but also on broader geopolitical orientations. This also reflects Russia's influence, with diplomatic efforts aimed at shaping states' positions and limiting recognition of Kosovo (Hoxhaj, 2022). On the one hand, Russia has used the Kosovo case to challenge the Western-led international order and to justify its actions in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, more recently, Crimea and eastern Ukraine. For Russia, accepting Kosovo's independence would mean accepting international interventions without the approval of the UN Security Council (Hoxhaj, 2016). Meanwhile, some other non-European countries faced internal political challenges, often influenced by other states, such as Serbia. External influence is evident in cases where decisions on recognition are not based only on independent assessments, but also on broader geopolitical orientations. Similarly, China maintains a cautious stance towards Kosovo due to its sensitivities regarding territorial integrity, particularly in relation to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. For this reason, China avoids legitimising unilateral secessionist movements and interprets the Kosovo case within the framework of state sovereignty principles (Rexhepi, 2025). An important aspect is that Kosovo's orientation with the Western liberal-democratic model is not universally shared by many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where differing political values and institutional frameworks influence attitudes towards statehood and international recognition. Therefore, the recognition or non-recognition of Kosovo can be understood as a consequence of the fragmented and evolving structure of the international system, of which Kosovo is also a part, and which is significantly shaped by great power rivalries and balances. Consequently, its position in the international arena will continue to be determined by the evolving configuration of the new world order.

5. KOSOVO'S INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATION

Alongside international recognition, Kosovo's membership in multilateral organisations and institutions has been a key priority. This is based on the understanding that full integration into the international system enables a state to advance its core interests and participate in international decision-making processes. In principle, membership in international organisations provides several benefits for Kosovo, including increased recognition and the strengthening of its international subjectivity. To date, Kosovo has joined numerous international and regional organisations, but as a small state with limited budgetary capacities, it has not pursued membership in every multilateral institution. Although it is not a member of the United Nations, Kosovo participates in several important international organisations. In 2009, it was admitted as a full member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with approximately 100 states voting in favour of its membership (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2009). In addition, Kosovo has become a member of several regional organisations as a sovereign and independent state, including Trade (CEFTA), Energy (ECSEE), Aviation (ECAA), International Transport (IRU) and many other organisations. Despite some initial successes in membership at the European and global levels, Kosovo was significantly isolated with regard to participation in regional organisations in South-East Europe. One of the main reasons, in addition to the non-recognition of its independence and Serbia's blockade, was the requirement by these states that Kosovo be represented by UNMIK. A turning point in Kosovo's membership in regional organisations occurred in 2012. In March of that year, Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on the representation and participation of Kosovo in regional organisations, forums, and initiatives (Hoxhaj, 2016). One case worth mentioning regarding regional non-cooperation and Serbia's non-implementation of the agreement is the case of the SEECP (South-East European Cooperation Process), one of the largest regional political organisations. In 2013, North Macedonia held the presidency of this organisation, and Kosovo expressed interest in joining, which was seen as an added value for Kosovo and was in line with the agreement with Serbia. After reaching preliminary agreement and securing support at the SEECP Ohrid Summit, Serbia, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, opposed Kosovo's membership in the final days before the summit. Subsequently, other states such as Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Turkey, and Bulgaria also cancelled their participation, resulting in the cancellation of the summit (Marusic, 2013). However, unlike the failed meeting in North Macedonia, the subsequent meeting held in Romania in 2014 marked a turning point in Kosovo's rapprochement with this organisation, where was invited and joined in the same manner as other SEECP member states. Despite these achievements at the regional level, a particular focus

was also placed on the country's membership in European political, financial, and cultural institutions. One of the earliest examples of membership was the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), where the country became a member as an independent and sovereign state. At the same time, Kosovo has developed bilateral cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. It also has cooperation with the OSCE, although this multilateral organisation is not formally open to Kosovo. Furthermore, membership in the International Olympic Committee, UEFA, and FIFA has been major achievements for Kosovo sport and society as a whole (Katrak, 2018). Regarding agreements, among the most important are those on normalisation with Serbia, mediated by the European Union, where as a result of internal reforms and participation in the dialogue process, the country was rewarded with the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2015. Another important agreement is the Integrated Border Management (IBM) agreement. Naturally, Kosovo would have preferred the demarcation of its border with Serbia, as was done with North Macedonia and Montenegro (Hoxhaj, 2016). The most significant agreements have been reached in the second level of the dialogue, the political level, which began in October 2012. The Brussels Agreement, signed on 19 April 2013 between Belgrade and Pristina, aimed at integrating the Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo into Kosovo's legal framework (Office of the Prime Minister, 2013), and this process continues to this day.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Even though Kosovo has the basic elements of statehood, such as territory, population, and institutions, full international recognition has not been achieved because states do not agree on its status. This means that Kosovo's international position is still strongly influenced by political and geopolitical factors, and not solely by legal criteria. One of the main findings is that great powers play a very important role in this process, where the United States and many European Union countries supported Kosovo's independence and its early recognition. On the other hand, Russia and China continue to oppose it, mainly due to concerns about sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the potential impact on other separatist movements. Due to this division among the great powers, Kosovo has not been able to become a member of the United Nations. Also, the process of recognising Kosovo has developed mainly through bilateral relations with individual states, rather than collective international recognition. This makes the process slower and more difficult, as it depends on the political positions and interests of each country. In some cases, recognition has even been challenged or withdrawn, showing that recognition is not always permanent. Another important conclusion is that some states do not recognise Kosovo because of their own internal political issues. Countries with separatist movements or territorial disputes are often cautious not to recognise Kosovo, as they fear that this could set a precedent for their own situations. This means that recognition is not only about Kosovo itself, but also about the internal concerns of other states. Overall, Kosovo has achieved at both the regional and international levels through important organisations and agreements, but the lack of UN membership remains the main obstacle to its full consolidation as a state in the international system. Although Kosovo was unable to secure UN membership in 2007, this does not mean that it will not happen in the future. So far, it has been clear about what should and should not be done, and when certain developments should or should not occur. In conclusion, the issue of Kosovo's recognition is mainly the result of political developments and global power competition in the international system. It is not only a legal issue, but primarily a political one. Therefore, Kosovo's future international status will depend on global political changes and the positions of the great powers.

REFERENCES

- Ahtisaari, M. (2007). *Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement*. United Nations.
- Bajrami, A. (2014). *Sistemi Kushtetues i Kosovës*. Prishtinë: Kolegji AAB.
- Bajrami, A. (2025). *Konferenca e Rambujesë dhe intervenimi i NATO-s në Kosovë*. Prishtinë: Akademia e Shkencave dhe e Arteve e Kosovës.
- Beha, A. (2014). Minority rights: An opportunity for adjustment of ethnic relations in Kosovo? *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 13(4), 85–110.
<https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2014/Beha.pdf>
- Beha, A. (2024). Constitution-making and statebuilding in Kosovo: we (you) the people. *Peacebuilding*. Taylor & Francis Group, 12:2, 186-206. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21647259.2023.2217575>
- Daku, S., Haziri, B., & Shabani, L. (2024). Motives for (non) recognition of Kosovo and Palestine. *Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental (RGSA)*, 18(6). <https://doi.org/10.24857/rgsa.v18n6-027>
- Duroselle, J. B., & Kaspi, A. (2009). *Historia e marrëdhënieve ndërkombëtare – nga viti 2045 në ditët e sotme* (Vëll. 2) (L. Papa, Trans.). Trianë: LIRA.
- Gruda, Z. (2009). *E Drejta Ndërkombëtare Publike*. Shkup: Furkan ISM.

- Hoti, A & Musliu, A. (2015). *Parimi i Vetëvendosjes dhe evoluimi i tij në të drejtën ndërkombëtare*. Prishtinë: Kolegji Iliria.
- Hoxhaj, E. (2008). *Politika etnike dhe shtetndërtimi i Kosovës*. Prishtinë: Dukagjini.
- Hoxhaj, E. (2016). *Ngritja e një shteti – Politika e Jashtme e Kosovës*. Tiranë: Shtypshkronja “Guttenberg”.
- Hoxhaj, E. (2022). *Përplasja e Madhe: Si po e lufton Rusia, Kosovën dhe Ballkanin*. Tiranë: Botimet UET Press.
- Imeri, D., & Azizi, A. (2023). Structural and non-structural obstacles in the process of recognition of independence of Kosovo: 2008–2021. *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 9(1).
- International Monetary Fund. (2009). *International Monetary Fund annual report 2009: Fighting the global crisis*. International Monetary Fund. <https://doi.org/10.5089/9781589068797.011>
- Judah, T. (2008). *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford University Press.
- Katrak, M. (2018). Kosovo’s pursuit of international recognition: Football Association of Serbia v. UEFA. *NLUJ Law Review*, 5(1), 1–25.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331224520_Kosovos_Pursuit_of_International_Recognition_Football_Association_of_Serbia_v_UEFA
- Malcolm, N. (2001). *Kosova, një histori e shkurtër* (A. Karjakdiu, Trans.). Koha Ditore dhe Shtëpia e Librit.
- Marusic, S. J. (2013, May 30). *Macedonia scraps regional presidential summit*. Balkan Insight. <https://balkaninsight.com/2013/05/30/macedonia-calls-off-regional-presidential-summit/>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora. (n.d.). *Lista e njohjeve*. <https://mfa-ks.net/lista-e-njohjeve/>.
- Office of the Prime Minister. (2013). *First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations*. Government of Kosovo. <https://kryeministri.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/First-agreement-of-principles-governing-the-normalization-of-relations-April-19-2013-Brussels-en.pdf>
- Rexhepi, R. (2025). Contested statehood: Exploring the reasons behind non-recognition of Kosovo by certain states. *Prizren Social Science Journal*, 9(1), 11–19. <https://doi.org/10.32936/pssj.v9i1.641>
- Szelag, P. (2024). The “limited recognition” problem and the international presence of the Republic of Kosovo. *Balkanica Posnaniensia XXXI*, 299–330. <https://doi.org/10.14746/bp.2024.31.15>
- Visoka, G. (2025). The diplomacy of state derecognition: When and why states lose diplomatic recognition. *Jus Cogens(Springer)*. https://doras.dcu.ie/31634/1/The%20Diplomacy%20of%20State%20Derecognition_When%20and%20Why%20States%20Lose%20Diplomatic%20Recognition_Jus%20Cogens.pdf