RUSSIAN ENERGY EXPORTS: AN ENGINE FOR COOPERATION OR A STRATEGIC WEAPON?

Authors

  • Filip Temelkovski University UNIBIT, Sofia, Bulgaria

Keywords:

Russian oil and gas, European Union, Gazprom, Energy, USA, Sanctions, Nord Stream

Abstract

Between the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the beginning of Russia's Special Operation in Ukraine (2022), three decades have passed. During that period, three leaders changed in the former Soviet Union, i.e. Russia, who marked the history of the largest country in the world. Gorbachev brought about with his famous perestroika to shake and disintegrate the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin completed the fall of this former great power, while Putin is perceived in Russia as a restorer of the former empire whose biggest trump card was geography and mineral natural resources in the foreground Russian oil and natural gas. In Yeltsin's era, from an economic and financial but also a technological point of view, Russia was in an inferior position and the only way out of the crisis was economic, commercial and technological cooperation with the European Union. In the 1990s, Russia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union, which was the starting point for the development and improvement of relations with the countries of the developed West. This agreement enabled the penetration of Russian energy, oil and natural gas into the European market. On the other hand, Russia could gain significant financial and technological capacities and impose on Europe with its export of oil, derivatives and especially natural gas. Over the years, despite the frequent criticism of the United States for its unilateral almost deterministic dependence on raw energies, which at certain historical moments can evolve into powerful weapons and blackmail. The thirst of the EU and its members for raw energy did not stop, but on the contrary intensified to reach huge percentages. In 2022, before the beginning of Russia's intervention in Ukraine, and the introduction of EU sanctions against Russia, the European Union imported 55% of its energy of which one third of this import depended on Russia. Russian participation in the needs of EU countries reached 35% oil, 30% coal, 33% natural gas. With the escalation of hostilities, it turned out that the fears of American experts that Russia would use its energy exports as a serious weapon of blackmail against EU countries were justified.

References

Allo, M. (2024). Deux ans de guerre en Ukraine… et de sanctions européennes : où en est-on vraiment avec le pétrole et le gaz russes ? https://www.rtbf.be/article/deux-ans-de-guerre-en-ukraine-et-de-sanctions-europeennes-ou-en-est-on-vraiment-avec-le-petrole-et-le-gaz-russes-11333694

Avioutskii, V. (2007). La guerre du gaz : gestion d'une rivalité commerciale russo-ukrainienne, Outre-Terre 2007/2 n° 19

Baldwin, H. (2023). RAPPORT GÉNÉRAL - LA GUERRE MENÉE PAR LA RUSSIE CONTRE L’UKRAINE : DÉFIS POSÉS À LA SÉCURITÉ ÉNERGÉTIQUE TRANSATLANTIQUE, NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEWMBLY, https://www.nato-pa.int/fr/document/2023-securite-energetique-rapport-baldwin-023-esc

Bouissou, J., Michel, A., & Tchoubar, P. (2024), Pourquoi l’impact des sanctions contre le pétrole russe s’affaiblit de jour en jour, https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2024/10/30/ pourquoi-l-impact-des-sanctions-contre-le-petrole-russe-s-affaiblit-de-jour-en-jour_6366342_4355770.html

Bureau, D., Glachant, J-M., & Schubert, K. (2023). The reform of the European electricity market: a triple challenge, Notes du conseil d’analyse économique 2023/1 n° 76, https://shs.cairn.info/journal-notes-du-conseil-d-analyse-economique-2023-1-page-1?lang=en

Claessens Rivest, M-R. (2008). La compagnie Gazprom, le bras droit du Kremlin, https://perspective. usherbrooke. ca/bilan/servlet/BMAnalyse/823

Clerget, J. (2014). De l'accord de partenariat et de coopération aux « quatre espaces communs »Valeurs démocratiques et malentendus culturels dans les relations entre l'Union européenne et la Russie, Les cahiers Irice 2014/2 n° 12

Flanagan, M., Kammer, A., Pescatori, A., & Stuermer, M. (2022). Comment l’arrêt des livraisons de gaz naturel russe pourrait peser sur les économies européennes, https://www.imf.org/fr/Blogs/Articles/2022/07/19/blog-how-a-russias-natural-gas-cutoff-could-weigh-on-european-economies

Gaudiaut, T. (2022). Levier du gaz russe : quel impact aurait l'arrêt des flux vers l'UE ? https://fr.statista.com/infographie/27829/impact-perte-de-pib-arret-livraisons-gaz-russe-par-pays-union-europeenne/

Godelier, M. (2024). Sortir du marché européen de l'électricité : les risques pour la France, https://www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/sortir-du-marche-europeen-de-l-electricite-les-risques-pour-la-france-998104.html

Hiault, R., & Heilmann, M.(2022). Les pays du G7 refusent de payer le gaz russe en rouble, https://www. lesechos. fr/monde/europe/les-pays-du-g7-refusent-de-payer-le-gaz-russe-en-rouble-1396685

Ifri (2019). La stratégie énergie 2035 de la Russie, https://www.connaissancedesenergies.org/la-strategie-energie-2035-de-la-russie-241104 https://fr.statista.com/statistiques/827112/capacite-production-energies-renouvelables-russie

La Tribune (2023). Gaz : les exportations russes ont chuté de 45,5% en 2022, hors de l'ex-bloc soviétique, latribune.fr.

Le Monde, A.F.P., Reuters, (2014). La Russie coupe le gaz à l'Ukraine https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/ 2014/06/16/la-negociation-sur-les-prix-du-gaz-entre-l-ukraine-et-la-russie-n-aboutit-pas_4438697_3214.html

Maussion, F. (2020). Ioukos : 5 questions sur une affaire hors norme, https://www.lesechos.fr/finance-marches/marches-financiers/ioukos-5-questions-sur-une-affaire-hors-norme-1172623

Poincaré, N. (2022). Nord Stream: qui aurait intérêt à faire sauter les gazoducs qui fournissent l'Europe?https://rmc.bfmtv.com/actualites/international/nord-stream-qui-aurait-interet-a-faire-sauter-les-gazoducs-qui-fournissent-l-europe_AV-202209280306.html

Revel, D. (2019). Quel équilibre futur pour l’offre et la demande d’énergieUn dossier de la revue Annales des Mines – Responsabilité et environnement, n° 95, 2019

Shapochkina, A.(2024). L’énergie russe après trois ans de guerre, https://www.areion24.news /2024/09/23/ lenergie-russe-apres-trois-ans-de-guerre/

Downloads

Published

2025-04-25

How to Cite

Temelkovski, F. (2025). RUSSIAN ENERGY EXPORTS: AN ENGINE FOR COOPERATION OR A STRATEGIC WEAPON?. KNOWLEDGE - International Journal , 67(1), 111–117. Retrieved from https://ojs.ikm.mk/index.php/kij/article/view/7354