THE EROSION OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER – SOME POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN POLITICS

Abstract

Russia’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which drastically altered the perception that Europe is destined to remain a zone of tranquility and has, as of the autumn of 2025, no clear end in sight, has shattered certain illusions regarding the ways in which liberal democratic countries may keep expansionist autocratic states in check and contributed to a profound reordering of the international system in terms of the post-Cold War rules-based order. While Russia’s eagerness and ability to successfully use soft power as part of its foreign policy toolkit has been contested by a number of scholars, it is reasonable to assume that one of the reasons Russia’s massive escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, which had already began in 2014, was deemed surprising even among a number of military experts, may be attributable to the expectation that the Russian state would not be inclined to take an all-out gamble on the hard power instrumentarium and seemingly discard its soft power potential. The paper employs a qualitative methodology, which includes an integrated analysis of a variety of secondary sources within the social science domain. It fulfils three primary objectives. Firstly, it argues that there are ample reasons to support the assertion that Russia’s waging of war against the entire country of Ukraine has severely curtailed its ability to project soft power, with no clear indications that these reputational damages could at all be salvageable in the conceivable future. Secondly, it contends that Russia’s soft power goes hand in hand with the success of its disinformation campaigns, so it is virtually inevitable that the country’s actions in Ukraine will diminish its effectiveness with regard to engaging in such adversarial activities over the course of the next decades. Thirdly, Russia’s war has encouraged many European countries to crack down on Russian media outlets and in certain cases ban certain parties that are viewed as pro-Russian from contesting elections. There are plenty of reasons to assume that at least until the war has conclusively ended, a new type of cordon sanitaire politics targeting pro-Russian parties may become par for the course in the political arena. Thus, Russia has most certainly suffered a decisive loss when it comes to being a paragon of soft power in the hearts and minds of the vast majority of Ukrainians, but the long-term negative effects in terms of the political space accorded to it in order to pursue disinformation operations will not be confined to Ukraine